

**00973**

**1962/11/01**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY  
G/PM



November 1, 1962

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MEMORANDUM

TO: G - U. Alexis Johnson  
FROM: G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen  
SUBJECT: Nitze Subcommittee

1. As a result of discussions which Walt Rostow and I had with Paul Nitze and Harry Rowen, Sy Weiss is now sitting for us on the Nitze Subcommittee.

2. As I understand it, the Nitze group was established primarily for the purpose of looking at Berlin and NATO problems as they relate to the Cuban crisis, i.e., how the special lessons learned from the Cuban crisis can be applied to our handling of the Berlin problem. In fact, however, Paul has apparently interpreted his mandate as requiring him to advance new proposals for the possible solution of the Berlin crisis, specifically in a Summit Conference context. As a result, his committee has devoted itself to the development of a paper exploring the various aspects of a Summit meeting (Attachment A).

3. Sy reported that the meeting he attended last night in the White House Situation Room was somewhat chaotic. In general, the posture around the table from the State representatives (Thompson, Schaetzel, Hillenbrand, Popper and Weiss) and the White House staff representative (Dave Klein) reflected a probing into the political realism of some of the proposals explored in the Nitze paper.

4. As a result, there was a certain amount of sharp, though friendly, exchange. One example might suffice. On page four, item III b. 1., a proposal is advanced for the unification of East and West Germany. Only in the discussion did it emerge that this would be a demilitarized Germany. The view was expressed that politically this was unthinkable. Nitze disagreed. Marty Hillenbrand, more or less, topped off the conversation by saying that if this were advanced to Adenauer (as was being suggested) the US would be well advised to race to Moscow since, as soon as Adenauer left the room, this is precisely what he would do in an attempt to reach his own accommodation with the Soviets! (In a later side conversation with [redacted])

IS/FPC/CDR *WJW* Date: *6-18-92*

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General Twitchell, Joint Staff, Sy jokingly noted that he was surprised to learn that DOD and the JCS were no longer interested in the 12 German divisions in NATO. Twitchell is still in orbit.

5. Tommy Thompson suggested that the various proposals be subjected to some additional, analytical appraisal as to their practical utility, a suggestion which Paul did not choose to follow up on. It was agreed, however, that the paper would be rewritten.

6. Our own appraisal is that this problem will probably eventually get back in line. It is hard to believe that Paul Nitze would advance proposals which are palatably unsound -- he is too intelligent and his vulnerability would be much too great. At the same time, however, quiet efforts are being made to try and get the Nitze Committee quietly phased out. As you know, Walt Rostow has a major operation under way on the whole question of negotiations with the Soviets. Similarly, Tyler and company are attempting to re-establish the normal channels on specific Berlin and NATO problems. In discussions with Schaetzel and Tyler, Sy learned that this matter has been quietly discussed with Mac Bundy, who seemed to be sympathetic to the need to get matters back on the right track. Also, Tyler has called Paul and suggested a meeting next week to discuss various NATO Annual Review problems -- the point being to try and get this matter back into the right channels. Tyler is very much aware of the need to handle this matter discreetly in order to maintain good relations with ISA over the longer term period.

7. I think it is important for you to have this general background, particularly in light of the fact that your assistance may be requested by EUR in interceding with the Secretary should matters not otherwise work themselves out.

Attachment

G/PM/Weiss/v1

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